Vulnerabilities and imperfections of single-photon detectors have been shown to compromise security for quantum key distribution (QKD). The measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) appears to be the most appealing solution to solve the issues. However, in practice one faces severe obstacles of having significantly lower key generation rate, difficult two photon interferences, and remote synchronization etc. In this letter, we propose a highly efficient and simple quantum key distribution scheme to remove all of these drawbacks. Our proposal can be implemented with only small modifications over the standard decoy BB84 system. Remarkably it enjoys both the advantages of high key generation rate (being almost two orders of magnitude higher than that based on conventional MDI-QKD) comparable to the normal decoy system, and security against any detector side channel attacks. Most favorably one can achieve complete Bell state measurements with resort to single photon interference, which reduces significantly experimental costs. Our approach enables utilization of high speed and efficient secure communication, particularly in reallife scenario of both metropolitan and intercity QKD network, with an attack free fashion from arbitrary detector side channels.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the fundamental problems in quantum communication. The QKD allows two parties, usually denoted as Alice and Bob, to communicate with each other via quantum and classical channels. From a theoretical point of view, quantum mechanics guarantees unconditional security of quantum cryptography protocols [3, 4] . However, there still exist a gap between the theory and practice. In realistic QKD demonstration, the devices are not so perfect, e.g., a detector with less than 100% efficiency or a laser with many colors. Any deficiency of the devices will lead to attacks, such as time-shift attack [5] and detector blinding attack [6] etc.
One popular solution to solve such problems is so-called device-independent-QKD (DI-QKD) [7, 8] . It allows that all the devices are untrusted including resources. Since the security of DI-QKD is based on the violation of Bell inequality, in experimental realization, the DI-QKD demands the loophole-free Bell tests [8] . These loopholes are mainly the lower detection efficiency, the measurement errors and other detection loopholes, which cannot be excluded or reduced based on today's technology. That's why the DI-QKD seems so hard to demonstrate.
To overcome this obstacle, measurement-device-independent-QKD (MDI-QKD) [9] [10] [11] is proposed without any assumption on the measurement devices to guarantee the security.
The first faithful implementation is successfully demonstrated in [13] . The MDI-QKD, proposed by H.-K. Lo et al. [9] , is currently the most effective solution against quantum hacking by removing detector side channel attacks. Up to now, several MDI-QKD experiments have been demonstrated [12, 13] . Especially in [13] , a faithful MDI-QKD demonstration is performed with random selection of encoding states and bases. In [12] a high interference visibility is obtained even under a real environment. In another fashion, polarization encoded MDI-QKD has also been successfully carried out [14, 15] , containing a proof-ofprinciple experiment [14] , and a real MDI-QKD demonstration over 10 km [15] . Despite these significant efforts [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , there still remain many realistic problems. The MDI-QKD requires twofold coincidence, which leads to much lower key generation rate. These experiments may suffer from high requirement of laser frequency stability or phase stabilization of the fiber interferometers. Consequently its realization and application are quite limited by its relatively high cost.
In this Letter we present a novel scheme to achieve high key generation rate, without resort to twofold coincidence. Our scheme involves only one weak coherent source at Alice's side, in which way one needs not to generate indistinguishable photons from two independent laser and perform two-photon Bell state measurement. As a result, an experimental realization would be much easier. At the mean time, the experimental cost can be reduced signigicantly. Our scheme are shown to be immune to all detector attacks and hold a performance close to the normal decoy BB84 protocol [21] . On the other hand, our scheme enjoys prominent advantages in implementing metropolitan and intercity QKD network. In a realistic scenario, for example typical distance among different sites is about 50 km to 80 km in the 'the Beijing-Shanghai Line' QKD network that covers a whole line of about 2000km.
In such situation, employment of our scheme would enable key generation rate of about two orders of magnitude higher than that of normal MDI-QKD protocol. Most favorably, with such distinctive features similar to the traditional decoy BB84 protocol, it removes out any possible detector side channel attacks. Besides, our scheme can be implemented with only small modifications over the standard decoy BB84 system in an cost-effective fashion.
Our Scheme-Suppose that Alice uses weak coherent states as her sources, while Bob, whose measurement devices are untrusted, has some trusted optical components in hand.
They use the Z and X basis for coding. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , our proposal runs as follows.
Step 1: Alice randomly chooses a basis from {X, Z} and a random bit from {0, 1}, then prepares and sends a phase randomized weak coherent pulse. If she picks the Z basis, she prepares her coherent states with either H or V polarizations according to the bit value.
Likely, if she picks the X basis, she prepares 45
• , 135
• polarized states. Alice can apply decoy-state [22] [23] [24] techniques to estimate the Z basis gain and the X basis quantum bit error rate (QBER) of single photon signal state.
Step 2, when Bob receives Alice's signal state, by the operation of PBS1 and half-wave plate (HWP), the polarization-information of the signal is transfered to path-information.
Bob then encodes two identical signal via the two arms, with the help of HWP and quarterwave plate (QWP).
Step 3: Bob combines two path signals with the PBS2 before sending to Charlie and finish a complete single photon Bell state measurement (BSM) [25, 32] . Charlie announces his detection results via a public channel.
Step 4: Via some authenticated public channels, Alice and Bob announce their preparation or encoding basis (i.e., Z and X basis) and post-select the events where the same basis 
Here the R/L label the two arms after PBS1, while H/V denotes two polarizations. Alice's and Bob's laboratories are well shielded from the eavesdropper, while the measurement device can be untrusted.
is used. To guarantee they share precise correlated data, according to the successful outputs they may need to apply bit flips or not (see TABLE I for details). Information reconciliation and privacy amplification are then performed to obtain acceptably secret shared key bits.
There are some common fundamental assumptions that the BB84 protocol, MDI-QKD, We remark that such obstacle that Bob faced is in fact equivalent to the case occurring in the "plug-and-play" QKD system. In the scenario, the sender has to encode photons that may be from some untrusted sources before delivering it to the receiver through some untrusted channels. Fortunately, This problem has been intelligently solved in [26, 27] and is proved to possess of unconditional security with some careful monitoring and a slight modified data analysis. The approach [26, 27] naturally works for our case to prevent any side channel attacks, including the Trojan horse attack. To rule out such attack, a combination of a filter, an optical switch, an intensity monitor, and a phase randomizer, should be added before any unknown source goes into the PBS1.
As showed in Fig. 1 , such countermeasure helps Bob be immune all eavesdropping strategies with slightly modified data processing [26, 27] . The filter and the randomizer promise that Bob's received pulses are in a single mode and have random phases. While the optical switch and the intensity monitor helps to randomly check the photon number of the input pulses.
We remark that these optical components can be improved. To increase the efficiency, the optical switch and its corresponding quantum random number generator can be replaced by a beam splitter [27] . Optical isolators can be placed on the two output optical beams of PBS2 before going to Charlie, in order to avoid the eavesdropper's possible Trojan horse attack from the output channel to the input channel of Bob's Lab. To be more conservative, one can also added optical switches and intensity monitors in the two arms after PBS2 to check if there is any eavesdropping instantly.
With above consideration, the optical design and monitoring will in principle ensure that
Bob's encoding information will not be leaked to any eavesdroppers. Moreover, like the case of MDI-QKD, single photon BSM that may be controlled by Eve or Charlie neither reveal any encoding information. Therefore, our scheme holds the distinctive feature in such MDI-QKD scenario that Bob need neither a real photon sources nor trusted measurement detectors.
His preparation of encoded states just exploit HWPs and QWPs, which are naturally be considered as trusted and controllable in his local lab. Therefore, the experimental cost of a realistic MDI-QKD realization can be reduced substantially. Besides, our scheme shares the common advantages with the traditional decoy BB84 protocol to have high key generating rate and works in high loss regime.
Key generation rate-We consider the scenario where the Z basis is used for key generation, while the X basis is used for testing and privacy amplification. Combined with the security proof of Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [28] and the approaches of [26, 27] , the key generation rate of our proposal can be straightforwardly derived as follows:
where Q Z µ and E Z µ denote, respectively, the overall gain and quantum bit error rate (QBER), and can be directly obtained from the experimental results. Here for illustration aim we ignores the very slight key consuming cost (via additional privacy amplification) by using optical switch, monitoring process and data post processing, which is close to zero in an ideal case [26, 27] . The subscript µ denotes the intensity of WCPs that Alice sends. The Q Z 1 and e X 1 denotes the probability of Charlie's successful BSM and the bit error rate, respectively, when Alice sends truly single photon. In a realistic experiment, these two parameters can be estimated by the decoy-state method. f (E Z µ ) > 1 is an inefficiency function for the error correction process, and H(x) = −x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) is the binary Shannon entropy function.
For simulation purpose, we consider a setup of our proposal with inefficient and noisy threshold detectors and employ experimental parameters from [9] . All detectors are assumed to have identical performance. That is to say, their dark count rate and detection efficiency are the same, while their dark counts are approximately independent on the incoming signals.
The total misalignment value is around 1.5%. The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 2 . We optimize the lower bound on R and the secure distance over Alice's WCPs' intensity, for the given parameter. For comparison, the lower bound on the secret key rate for a traditional decoy-state BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD protocol are also illustrated in Fig. 2 .
We can find that the key rate of our protocol is largely the same level with regard to that of traditional decoy-state BB84 protocol, while the maximal secure distance is slightly smaller than that of traditional decoy-state BB84 protocol of a few kilometers. This is because the overall dark count rate in our protocol is twice of that in decoy-state BB84 protocol.
From the Fig. 2 , one can explicitly see the performances of three protocols. Our simulation results show that, the key generation rate of our scheme is about two order of magnitude higher than that of MDI-QKD, in the range of 0˜120 km for a realistic scenario. Simultaneously at such range our scheme performs almost the same level as the traditional decoy state BB84 protocol for the key generation rate. This implies that besides the low cost, our scheme is the most appealing due to its high key generation rate, and character of being immune to all detector side channel attacks. To summarize, our scheme enjoys a tremendous advantages in the experimental cost, key generation rate and guaranteed unconditional security.
Security analysis-Here we clarify the unconditional security of our proposal with regard to any detector attacks.
Consider the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) based QKD protocol [29] . To achieve the shared entanglement between Alice and Bob, suppose here Charlie has only one photon which is entangled with Alice's photon on the polarization freedom. Charlie's photon can be simultaneously entangled with Bob's photon on the path freedom. This is physically feasible by straightforward verification. Then Charlie can perform a full BSM on his photon and broadcast his measurement result to implement entanglement swapping [30] between Alice and Bob. After receiving the broadcasts, Bob makes a corresponding rotation to finish entanglement swapping process. In this stage, Alice and Bob can measure their parties using the X or Z bases randomly and then announce their measurement bases. Via data post-processing, say error-correction and privacy amplification, they can generate security keys from the raw data. Now, let's consider in a time-reversed version [32] in which Alice's and Bob's measurements is before Charlie's measurement. This can be done because Charlie's operations commute with those of Alice and Bob. After reversing the order of the measurements, the new scenario is equivalent to the case of Alice sending a random BB84 polarization photonic state and then transferring to spatial mode, while Bob constitutes another a random BB84 polarization state by directly encoding over the same photon. The single photon two-qubit are finally combined altogether to be made a full BSM by Charlie. This scenario is exactly a novel form of EPR based protocol equipped with entanglement swapping, by which way the unconditionally security of our scheme is guaranteed. We leave the full security analysis and finite size analysis in future publication.
Discussion-The idea of our scheme can be expanded much further. Firstly, although
we use polarization and path encoding, one can use any other encoding schemes such as phase encoding [16, 17] or time-bin encoding [31] . Polarization encoding is more suitable for free-space implementations, while phase encoding and time-bin encoding are more adequate for fibre-based realisations. Secondly, our proposal works for other QKD protocols. For example, it's easy to transfer our proposal to six-state protocol [32] as the combination of QWP and HWP enables us to encode on the X, Y and Z basis.
In a practical application, our protocol would show its prominent advantages for its high key generation rate during the range of the effective length about 150 km, which is longer than most distances between two neighboring cities. For example, the quantum secret communication project 'the Beijing-Shanghai Line' whose total length is about 2000 km contains many relays. The distance of two the neighboring relays are about 50 km to 80 km. If employing our scheme, it will significantly reduce the demands on detectors than the decoy-state BB84 protocol, while one can achieve unconditional security over all detector side channel attacks. We also remark here that the single photon interference can be stabilized with the state of the art technology very well [32] . Also one can employ other possible structure like Sagnac interferometer etc. to achieve better stability for special encodings.
As far as BSM is concerned, we note that one can also make any other joint measurements, which however does not reveal any encoding information for both Alice and Bob.
Conclusion-In summary, we have provided a QKD proposal with high efficiency while removing all the detector side channel attacks. The whole proposal only needs one photon source from Alice, while in Bob's side, one only performs suitable encoding. The unconditional security of our proposal has been shown to be guaranteed by time-reversed EPR based QKD and entanglement swapping. Moreover, it enjoys the virtue of a relatively higher key generation rate, compared with the normal MDI-QKD proposal. So our proposal naturally and operationally works for standard threshold detectors with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. With the lower cost but relatively higher security, we believe our proposal paves one way towards the highly efficient realization of MDI-QKD in a much more extensive scenarios, and motivate the novel implementations of the full DI-QKD. We expect our idea would significantly stimulate promising applications for high speed QKD networks and being immune to arbitrary detector attacks.
